We construct secret-key encryption (SKE) schemes that are secure against related-key attacks and in the presence of key-dependent messages (RKA-KDM secure). We emphasize that RKA-KDM security is not merely the conjunction of individual security properties, but covers attacks in which ciphertexts of key-dependent messages under related keys are available. Besides being interesting in their own right, RKA-KDM secure schemes allow to garble circuits with XORs very efficiently (Applebaum, TCC 2013). Until now, the only known RKA-KDM secure SKE scheme (due to Applebaum) is based on the LPN assumption. Our schemes are based on various other computational assumptions, namely DDH, LWE, QR, and DCR. We abstract from Applebaum's construction and proof, and formalize three generic technical properties that imply RKA-KDM security: one property is IND-CPA security, and the other two are the existence of suitable oracles that produce ciphertexts under related keys, resp. of key-dependent messages. We then give simple SKE schemes that achieve these properties. Our constructions are variants of known KDM-secure public-key encryption schemes. To additionally achieve RKA security, we isolate suitable homomorphic properties of the underlying schemes in order to simulate ciphertexts under related keys in the security proof. RKA-KDM security for our schemes holds w.r.t. affine functions (over the respective mathematical domain). From a conceptual point of view, our work provides a generic and extensible way to construct encryption schemes with multiple special security properties.
in certain applications, ciphertext indistinguishability is not sufficient. For instance, in harddisk encryption, encryptions of the secret key itself naturally occur (see [25] ). Security in the presence of such key-dependent messages (KDM security [23] ) is not implied by IND-CPA or IND-CCA security [23, 1] . There are numerous other specialized notions of encryption scheme security, such as security under related-key attacks (RKAs [7] ), leakage-resilience [35, 29] , security under bad randomness [10] , security under selective openings [11] , and others.
In this paper, we consider two such specialized notions of security for SKE schemes in a combined fashion. In particular, we will derive SKE schemes that are secure in the presence of key-dependent messages encrypted under related keys. This notion, dubbed RKA-KDM security and already considered by Applebaum [4] (as RK-KDM security), combines the notions of KDM and RKA security, but is more than just their conjunction. RKA-KDM secure SKE schemes are of course suitable for all applications in which RKA or KDM security is required. In fact, there are even applications that explicitly require the combined RKA-KDM notion: Applebaum [4] uses RKA-KDM secure SKE schemes in a garbled circuit construction in which XOR gates can be garbled for free (in the sense that XOR gates require no explicit encryption whatsoever). Besides, "aggregating" security properties as in RKA-KDM security may eventually lead to more "ideal" and universally useful security notions and encryption schemes.
RKA and KDM security. To give more details, we first recall the definitions of IND-CPA, RKA, and KDM security. In a nutshell, an SKE scheme has indistinguishable ciphertexts (or, is IND-CPA secure [30] 3 ), if no efficient adversary A can tell apart whether it is interacting with an oracle Real, or with an oracle Fake. Here, upon input M , oracle Real returns an encryption E k (M ) of M , while Fake returns an encryption E k (0 |M | ) of a zero-string of the same length. (In other words, A is asked to tell authentic encryptions from encryptions of meaningless messages of the same length.)
For security under key-dependent messages (KDM security [23] ), we require the same, except that messages are now functions in the secret key. That is, upon input a function ψ, Real returns E k (ψ(k)), and Fake returns E k (0 |ψ(k)| ). Depending on the class of allowed functions Ψ , there are many constructions of KDM-secure encryption schemes from various computational assumptions, e.g. [23, 31, 33, 25, 5, 28, 6, 26, 27, 34, 8, 12, 3, 32] . However, most of these works follow the design principle of Boneh et al. [25] (henceforth BHHO). Namely, it should be publicly possible (or at least given some "harmless" extra information) to construct key-dependent encryptions from regular ones. Intuitively, if this is the case, then clearly the presence of key-dependent encryptions is no more harmful than the presence of "regular", key-independent encryptions.
For security under related-key attacks (RKA security [9] ), we again require the same as for IND-CPA security, except that an adversary A now specifies a function ϕ on secret keys alongside each message M to be encrypted. Real then returns an encryption E ϕ(k) (M ) of M under the related key ϕ(k), and Fake returns E ϕ(k) (0 |M | ). RKA security draws its motivation primarily from the wide range of attacks that are known in this setting, e.g. [16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 20, 22] . There are also a number of constructions of RKA secure schemes, e.g. [7, 13, 36, 4] . As with KDM security, the main idea is to generate encryptions under related keys from "regular" encryptions.
RKA-KDM security. It is of course easy to combine RKA and KDM security into a combined notion, which we call RKA-KDM security here. Concretely, RKA-KDM security is defined like IND-CPA security above, only that an adversary supplies functions ϕ and ψ along with the message M to be encrypted. Then, Real returns E ϕ(k) (ψ(k)), and Fake returns E ϕ(k) (0 |ψ(k)| ). This notion has already been defined by Applebaum [4] (dubbed RK-KDM security there), who used RKA-KDM secure schemes to garble circuits with XOR gates in a very elegant and efficient way. As a proof of concept, Applebaum also constructed an RKA-KDM secure encryption scheme, starting from the KDM-secure scheme of Applebaum et al. [5] based on the LPN assumption. (Along the way, he also shows that RKA-KDM security is strictly stronger than the conjunction of RKA and KDM security.) Currently, no further RKA-KDM secure schemes are known.
Our contribution. In this work, we provide a generic framework to construct RKA-KDM secure encryption schemes, and we instantiate this framework under several computational assumptions. In particular, we provide RKA-KDM secure schemes from the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH), learning with errors (LWE), quadratic residuosity and decisional Diffie-Hellman (QR+DDH) 4 , and decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumptions. Our constructions support affine KDM and RKA functions in the "natural domain" of the respective secret keys. Furthermore, with the exception of the DCR-based scheme, all of our schemes can be directly used in the application of Applebaum [4] . Additionally, they fit the construction of Bellare et al. [14] , and thus can be extended from projection-KDM security to bounded-KDM security while maintaining the same level of RKA security.
Our approach. Based on an informal remark of Applebaum [4, Remark 3.6 in full version], we first reduce RKA-KDM security to three technical properties of the scheme in question: (a) IND-CPA security in the usual sense, (b) the existence of an oracle (that itself has access to an E k (·) oracle) that generates ciphertexts E ϕ(k) (M ) under related keys, and (c) the existence of an oracle (with access to E k (·)) that generates ciphertexts E k (ψ(k)) of key-dependent messages. Intuitively, property (b) allows to reduce any RKA-KDM attack to a KDM attack, which in turn can be reduced (using (c)) to an IND-CPA attack. We note that it seems possible to add further oracles (e.g., for encryption queries with leakage) to achieve even stronger combined security notions from individual and isolated technical properties.
We then proceed to construct several RKA-KDM secure encryption schemes. Our constructions are slight variations of the known KDM-secure schemes from [25, 5, 6, 26, 34] . For these schemes, properties (a) and (c) already follow (with slight modifications) from the KDM security proofs of the underlying schemes. Showing property (b) then boils down to showing suitable homomorphic properties of the encryption, resp. decryption algorithm.
Example: our DDH-based scheme. To give a taste of the proof, we outline our DDH-based scheme (which is based upon the DDH-based public-key encryption scheme from [25] ). In this scheme, a ciphertext is of the form
where λ is the security parameter, g and the g i are uniformly random generators of the underlying cyclic group, the r i are uniformly random exponents, and g 0 = i∈[λ] (g ri i ) −ki for the secret key k = (k 1 , . . . , k λ ) ∈ {0, 1} λ . (In the original public-key encryption scheme from [25] , all r i are identical.)
We show property (b) for functions of the form ϕ ∆ :
(This will be sufficient for the application in [4] .) To show (b), we only need to show that any given ciphertext C = E k (M ) as above can be transformed into a ciphertext C = E ϕ ∆ (k) (M ). For simplicity, assume that ∆ = (1, 0, . . . , 0). In this case, it is easy to see that
is a perfectly distributed encryption of M under key k = k⊕∆ (with randomness r 1 = −r 1 and r i = r i for i > 1). This shows property (b) -the other properties follow as in [25] . 5 Our other constructions proceed similarly, starting from the schemes of Applebaum et al. [5] , Brakerski and Goldwasser [26] , and Malkin et al. [34] . The latter is only contained in our full version [24] .
Preliminaries
Notation. For n ∈ N, let [n] := {1, . . . , n}. Throughout the paper, λ ∈ N denotes the security parameter. For a finite set S, we denote by s ← S the process of sampling s uniformly from S. For a distribution X, we denote by x ← X the process of sampling x from X. For a probabilistic algorithm A, we denote with y := A(x; r) the process of running A on input x and with randomness r, and assigning y the result. We let R A denote the randomness space of A; we require R A to be of the form R A = {0, 1} . We write y ← A(x) for y ← A(x; r) with uniformly chosen r ∈ R A . If A's running time is polynomial in λ, then A is called probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT). For a real number x, let the floor function x denote the largest integer not greater than x. For a vector v, v i denotes the ith element of v.
Two sequences of random variables
iff the same holds for any algorithm D with unbounded runtime. 
be a symmetric encryption scheme, π ← Pg(1 λ ) be public parameters and b ← {0, 1} be a bit chosen by the challenger. A key k ← Kg(π) is randomly chosen. Adversary A makes encryption queries by submitting (ϕ ∈ Φ, ψ ∈ Ψ ) and receives a response from one of the following oracles, depending on the bit b.
-If b = 1, oracle Real k takes as input (ϕ, ψ) and returns C ← E ϕ(k) (ψ(k)).
-If b = 0, oracle Fake k takes as input (ϕ, ψ) and returns C ← E ϕ(k) (0 |ψ(k)| ).
is a negligible function in λ. Further security definitions. The standard definition of RKA security follows from restricting the KDM function class Ψ to constant functions, and the definition of KDM security follows from restricting the RKA function class Φ to the identity function. IND-CPA security follows from applying both of these restrictions at once.
A generic approach
In this section we prove that an SKE scheme Σ is RKA-
oracle (defined below) for Σ that takes as input E k (M ) and RKA function ϕ ∈ Φ, and returns something that is indistinguishable from E ϕ(k) (M ) without knowledge of the key k, there is a so called KDM[Ψ ] oracle (defined below) for Σ that takes as input E k (M ) and KDM function ψ ∈ Ψ , and returns something that is indistinguishable from E k (ψ(k)) without knowledge of the key k (M is the constant part of ψ here). 
is a negligible function in λ.
Note that for constant functions ψ ∈ Ψ a sufficient behaviour of F KDM[Ψ ] is to output the ciphertext it received without changes. All KDM[Ψ ] oracles presented in this paper implicitly adopt this behaviour.
Proof. We prove the theorem by a sequence of games.
. Given a distinguisher D between this game and Game 1, we can construct an adversary S, henceforth called simulator, on the indistinguishability of F KDM [Ψ ] . First, the simulator forwards the public parameters π to D and picks a bit b ← {0, 1}. For b = 1 and each query (ϕ, ψ) from D, the simulator queries its oracle for ψ and either gets a response .
Analogously to the indistinguishability of Game 1 and Game 2, we can easily transform a distinguisher between this game and the previous game into an IND-CPA adversary for Σ.
We observe that the advantage of any PPT adversary in Game 3 is 0 since the behaviour of the oracle given to the adversary is is independent of the bit b picked by the experiment. This concludes our proof since Game 3 and Game 0 are indistinguishable.
3 RKA-KDM-secure Encryption Schemes 3.1 Boneh et al. [25] The PKE scheme of Boneh et al. [25] was the first construction provably KDM secure under standard assumptions. In this section we detail a SKE analogue of the 'basic' version of their scheme. We construct an RKA[Φ] oracle and a KDM[Ψ ] oracle for the scheme. The class of RKA functions Φ allows for XOR operations on the key while the class of KDM functions Ψ brings circular KDM security, i.e., encryptions of the secret key are possible (as in the original paper). The security of the scheme is based on the DDH assumption.
DDH assumption. The decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption over a group G (that may depend on the security parameter λ) stipulates that
where g ← G and x, y, z ← [|G|] are uniformly distributed.
For the sake of readability we introduce the scheme Σ BHHO with message space {0, 1}. Canonical concatenation at the end will yield the scheme Σ BHHO with message space {0, 1} λ .
The SKE scheme Σ BHHO . Let G be a group of prime order p and g be a generator of G. The scheme Σ BHHO for M ∈ {0, 1} is defined as follows:
-Pg(1 λ ) picks generators g 1 , . . . , g λ ← G\{1} and returns π := (G, g, g 1 , . . . , g λ ).
-Kg(π) returns a random bitstring k ← {0, 1} λ .
-E k (M ) picks r 1 , . . . , r λ ← Z p . Sets g 0 := i∈[λ] (g ri i ) −ki and returns
x ki i . Returns 0 ifM = 1, returns 1 ifM = g, otherwise returns ⊥.
The RKA[Φ] oracle. For the concrete class of RKA functions
for Σ BHHO as follows: Given a ciphertext C = (x 1 , . . . , x λ , y) and a function ϕ ∆ it outputs
To understand this better we assume that C is an honestly generated ciphertext (as it will be in the indistinguishability experiment for F RKA[Φ] ). Then we have y = g M · i∈[λ] x −ki i . We observe
and ( * ) since
Therefore C decrypts to M under key k ⊕ ∆. The KDM[Ψ ] oracle. For the class of KDM functions
we find the following KDM[Ψ ] oracle F KDM[Ψ ] for Σ BHHO : Given a function ψ i,b and an honestly generated ciphertext of b (the constant part of ψ i,b is b) denoted C = (x 1 , . . . , x λ , y) it outputs
We check that this ciphertext decrypts to k i ⊕ b:
oracle in the sense of Definition 3.
Proof. We show that the distributions of
are perfectly indistinguishable. First, we observe that x i = g ri i and g = g α i for α := log gi (g), i.e., Proof. Intuitively, we first use the hardness of DDH over G to collapse the randomness used by the encryption oracle to one random exponent per ciphertext, so instead of r 1 , . . . , r λ all generators are taken to the same random exponent r. This modified scheme is the 'basic' version of [25] with a smaller message space. We can then simply reduce security to the IND-CPA security of Boneh et al's scheme.
More concretely, we prove the lemma with the following sequence of games.
Game 0 In Game 0 A plays the original IND-CPA experiment. Game 1 to Game λ − 1 form a hybrid argument to collapse the randomness used by the encryption oracle. In hybrid i (i ∈ [λ − 1]) we pick the same randomness for the first i + 1 components of the ciphertext. I.e., the format of a ciphertext output by the encryption oracle in game i is
Analysis. Each of the game hops above is indistinguishable due to the hardness of DDH over G. The simulation for a hop from Game i−1 to Game i (i ∈ [λ−1]) works as follows: The simulator S gets a DDH challenge (g, X := g x , Y := g y , Z := g xy/z ). For j ∈ [λ] \ {i + 1} it picks α j ← Z p , sets g j := g αj and g i+1 := X. Subsequently it picks a key k ← {0, 1} λ and sends the public parameters π := (G, g, g 1 , . . . , g λ ) to A. If A requests an encryption of message M , S picks randomness r, r i+2 , . . . , r λ , a, b ← Z p and setsŶ := g a · Y b andẐ := X a · Z b to re-randomize the DDH challenge. Finally, S sends Ŷ rα1 , . . . ,Ŷ rαi ,Ẑ r , g ri+2 i+2 , . . . , g M · g 0 to the adversary where g 0 is computed as usual (S knows k). If Z = g z , the output of S looks like that of game i − 1, otherwise (for Z = g xy ) it looks like that of game i. Any PPT distinguisher between those games with non-negligible advantage can thus be used to break DDH. Finally, only one fresh random exponent is used for each ciphertext in game λ − 1. The output now looks like that of the BHHO (public key) cryptosystem with message space {g 0 , g 1 }.
In Game λ, we replace the message with 0. The indistinguishability of game λ − 1 and game λ can be reduced to the IND-CPA security of Boneh et al's original scheme in a straightforward way (using the generators from the public key as public parameters). Hence IND-CPA security of Σ BHHO follows.
The full scheme Σ BHHO . Finally, we assemble the SKE scheme Σ BHHO from λ instances of Σ BHHO that use the same public parameters π and the same key k. A ciphertext under Σ BHHO is a matrix from G λ×(λ+1) where each row is an instance of Σ BHHO (using π and key k). To encrypt a message M ∈ {0, 1} λ under key k we encrypt M i in row i (while picking fresh randomness r i , i ∈ [λ] for each row). Decryption also works row-wise.
For the RKA[Φ] oracle we apply F RKA[Φ] to each row. The class of KDM functions Ψ changes to 
Applebaum et al. [5]
In this section, we present a secret-key version of the PKE scheme of Applebaum et al. [5] and prove it RKA-KDM secure. For compatibility with Applebaum's application, however, we slightly change the space of secret keys from Z m p to {0, 1} m . Our RKA and KDM oracles allow encryptions under keys k ⊕ ∆ (for arbitrary ∆ ∈ {0, 1} m ) of arbitrary components of the secret key. Security is based on the LWE assumption.
For ease of exposition, we do not detail the choices of the following parameters -these can occur as in [5] (with adaptations as in [2] due to the different choice of secret key). Let q be a polynomial in the security parameter λ, and let m > n be integers (that may also depend on λ). By χ, we denote a (discretized Gaussian) error distribution with suitable parameters over Z q .
LWE assumption. Let s ∈ Z n q be uniformly chosen. Let LWE s be the oracle that (on trivial input) returns (a, a; s + x) ∈ Z n q × Z q for freshly chosen a ← Z n q and x ← χ. Let RND be the oracle that returns a freshly and independently chosen (a, b) ← Z n q × Z q . The LWE assumption states that oracle access to LWE s is computationally indistinguishable from oracle access to RND.
Applebaum et al. [5] show that the LWE assumption over Z q = Z p 2 and with s ← Z n p is equivalent to the LWE assumption as above (for q = p). Furthermore, Akavia et al. [2] show that the LWE assumption with s ← {0, 1} n is implied by the LWE assumption as above (for different parameters of n, m). In the following, we will consider q = p 2 and s ∈ {0, 1} n . Furthermore, for x ∈ R, we write x p := x + 1/2 mod p for the nearest integer to x modulo p.
The SKE scheme Σ ACPS . The scheme Σ ACPS (with M ∈ Z p ) is defined as follows:
-Pg(1 λ ) returns the empty bitstring. Compared to the PKE scheme of [5] , we choose s slightly differently, and also choose different A, x upon each encryption. We note that correctness holds only with overwhelming probability over the choice of r and x. In particular, | x; r | < p/2 with overwhelming probability.
The RKA[Φ] oracle. For the concrete class of RKA functions ∆ i y i
As with the BHHO scheme, a quick calculation shows that C is a perfectly distributed ciphertext of M under k ⊕ ∆. Thus:
oracle in the sense of Definition 2.
The KDM[Ψ ] oracle. For the class of KDM functions
and following [5] , we find the following KDM[Ψ ] oracle F KDM[Ψ ] for Σ ACPS : Given a function ψ i,b and an honestly generated ciphertext C = (y, z) of M = b, it outputs C := y + (−1) b p e i , z for the i-th unit vector e i .
In fact, it is easy to see that ciphertexts C as produced by F KDM[Ψ ] are perfectly distributed ciphertexts of s i ⊕ b. We get:
Lemma 11. The SKE scheme Σ ACPS is IND-CPA secure if the LWE assumption holds for the respective parameters.
A sketch of the proof is contained in the full version of this paper [24] .
The full scheme Σ ACPS . As in the BHHO setting, we can construct the full scheme Σ ACPS with message space Z m p from m instances of Σ ACPS that use the same public parameters and key in a straightforward manner.
Likewise, by transferring Lemma 9, Lemma 10 and Lemma 11 from Σ ACPS to Σ ACPS and by Theorem 4, we get Theorem 12. The SKE scheme Σ ACPS is RKA-KDM[Φ, Ψ ] secure (for Φ as defined above in this section and Ψ from the full BHHO scheme) if the LWE assumption holds for the respective parameters.
Brakerski-Goldwasser [26]
In this section we consider the encryption scheme of Brakerski and Goldwasser [26] , modified to the symmetric setting. The KDM security of the original (publickey) scheme relies on the hardness of deciding quadratic residuosity in the group Z * N , for Blum integer N = p · q. To construct our SKE scheme Σ BG resilient against related key attacks, we additionally have to stipulate that DDH is hard over the subgroup of quadratic residues QR N . We achieve security against the same class of KDM functions as for Σ BHHO from Section 3.1.
QR assumption. Let N be a Blum integer of bitlength λ. With Z * N [+1] we denote the set of elements in Z * N with Jacobi symbol +1 and with QR N := {x 2 mod N : x ∈ Z * N } the set of Quadratic Residues modulo N . Then we say that the Quadratic Residuosity (QR) assumption holds in Z * N if
is negligible for all PPT adversaries A.
The SKE scheme Σ BG . We define the scheme for messages M ∈ {0, 1}.
-Pg(1 λ ) picks a random Blum integer N of length (λ). 6 Then samples quadratic residues g 1 , . . . , g λ ← QR N and returns π := (N, g 1 , . . . , g λ ). 
Given a function ψ i,b and a ciphertext C = (x 1 , . . . , x λ , y), the KDM[Ψ ] oracle F KDM[Ψ ] for Σ BG simply returns C := (x 1 , . . . , x λ , y ) := (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , (−1) · x i , x i+1 , . . . , x λ , y)
We check that this decrypts to
x j kj ( * ) the sense of Definition 3 if QR is hard in the underlying group Z * N . Proof. To show the indistinguishability of F KDM[Ψ ] 's output we use the interactive vector game (IV) from [26] , Section 5. In the interactive λ-vector game the experiment picks a Blum integer N , a quadratic residues g 1 , . . . , g λ ← QR N and a bit b ← {0, 1} and sends N, g 1 , . . . , g λ to a PPT adversary A that has to guess b. It then provides A with an oracle that, given a query a ∈ {0, 1} λ , returns ((−1) a1 g r 1 , . . . , (−1) a λ g r λ ) if b = 0 and (g r 1 , . . . , g r λ ) if b = 1 for fresh randomness r. [26] show that A's advantage is negligible if the QR assumption holds in Z * N . Let D be a PPT algorithm to distinguish F KDM[Ψ ] (ψ, E k (M )) from E k (ψ(k)) in the sense of Definition 3. We construct an adversary S on the interactive 1-vector game that utilizes D: First, S sets π to the parameters (N, g 1 , . . . , g λ ) received from the interactive λ-vector game, samples a key k ← {0, 1} λ and then sends π and k to D. For each query ψ i,b received from D, S picks randomness r 1 , . . . , r i−1 , r i+1 , . . . , r λ ← [N 2 ] and queries the interactive λ-vector game with vector a ∈ {0, 1} λ where a i := 1 and a j := 0 for j = i. S gets a response (x 1 , . . . , x λ ) and sets x i := x i and x j := x rj j for j = r. It then sends (
It is easy to check that this equals
) if the bit picked by the λ-vector game is 0, or E k (ψ(k);r) otherwise (where randomnessr := (rr 1 , . . . , r i−1 , r, r i+1 , . . . , rr λ )). The advantage of S is the advantage of D at the same asymptotic time complexity. Thus, if QR holds in Z * N , no such adversary D with non-negligible advantage can exist.
Lemma 15. The SKE scheme Σ BG is IND-CPA secure if QR is hard over thegroup Z * N and DDH is hard over the subgroup of quadratic residues QR N . Proof. This proof is completely analogous to the IND-CPA proof for Σ BHHO (see Lemma 7) . We first collapse the randomness to one random exponent per ciphertext. For this we rely on the hardness of DDH over QR N . Subsequently we utilize the IND-CPA security of Brakerski and Goldwasser's original scheme to conclude the proof.
The full scheme Σ BG . Analogously to the setting for BHHO (Section 3.1), we can canonically construct the full scheme Σ BG for message space {0, 1} λ from λ instances of Σ BG using the same public parameters and the same key. The class of RKA functions remains the same, while the class of KDM functions automatically extends from Ψ to 
Bellare et al. [14]
Since Applebaum's work on KDM amplification [3] , it is known that projection-KDM security implies bounded-KDM security. Projection-KDM security allows for KDM functions where each output bit depends only on one input bit (key bit). Bounded-KDM security means that the class of KDM functions is the set of all functions that can be represented by a circuit of bounded size L. We refer to this function class as Ψ bnd(L) from now on. To our knowledge, currently the most efficient way to construct a bounded-KDM secure scheme from a projection-KDM secure one is the approach of Bellare, Hoang, and Rogaway [14] (henceforth BHR). In this section we observe that their construction also maintains RKA security in our sense. Thus, we can plug all of our projection-KDM secure schemes (i.e., Σ BG , Σ ACPS and Σ BHHO ) into their framework to get RKA-bounded-KDM secure schemes. Obviously, this result holds for any projection-KDM secure scheme that is RKA secure (with a suitable oracle in our sense).
(Projective) garbling schemes. What follows is a quick introduction to garbling schemes established by [14] . A garbling scheme is a tuple of algorithms (GC garble , GC encode , GC decode , GC eval ). 7 The algorithm GC garble is probabilistic while the remaining algorithms are deterministic. Given an encoding of the security parameter and a function f , GC garble (1 λ , f ) outputs the description of a garbled circuit (F, e, d). Here, F is a function mapping garbled inputs to garbled outputs. E.g., F could be a circuit in terms of gates and wires together with a garbled table for each gate. The outputs e and d contain information to encode and decode the input and output of F respectively. We say that a garbling scheme is correct if GC decode (d, GC eval (F, GC encode (M, e))) = f (M ) for all functions f (from a certain class), inputs M ∈ {0, 1} λ and descriptions (F, e, d) ← GC garble (1 λ , f ) of garbled circuits for f .
For our application we need so-called projective garbling schemes. Basically, a garbling scheme is projective if for all x := GC encode (e, M ) and x := GC encode (e, M ), we have |x i | = |x i | for i ∈ [λ] and x i = x i for i ∈ [λ] with M i = M i (see [15] for a rigorous definition). One well-known way to construct a projective garbling scheme is to assign a pair of keys to each wire corresponding to low and high voltage (0/1) respectively. Then e is a tuple of pairs of keys and GC encode (M, e) picks the keys from e corresponding to the bits of M .
Furthermore, we say that a garbling scheme is privacy preserving if for any two (adversarially chosen) functions f 0 , f 1 with the same circuit size and inputs x 0 , x 1 of same length with f 0 (x 0 ) = f 1 (x 1 ), no adversary can distinguish (F 0 , GC encode (e 0 , x 0 ), d 0 ) from (F 1 , GC encode (e 1 , x 1 ), 1}) . We refer to [15] for a more detailed definition.
The construction of BHR. The construction creates a symmetric KDM[Ψ bnd(L) ]secure encryption scheme Σ BHR = (Pg, Kg, E, D) from any projection-KDM-
